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1.Scope of the project 
 Technical context  
   
 
For sustainability purpose, the “European Sustainable Nuclear 
Industrial Initiative” (ESNII) was launched in November 2010 inside 
the European Union to anticipate the development of a fleet of fast 
reactors with closed cycle i.e.  
 
 Sodium cooled Fast Reactors (SFR),  
 Lead cooled Fast Reactors (LFR) and 
 Gas cooled Fast Reactors (GFR). 
 ESNII also includes some support infrastructures with in particular an 
irradiation fast spectrum test facility i.e. the FAst Spectrum Transmutation 
Experimental Facility (FASTEF) able to test both the LFR technology and the 
Accelerator Driven System (ADS) technology. 
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1. Scope of the project 
The SARGEN_IV consortium 
 
The SARGEN_IV represents an opportunity to prepare the safety 
assessment for the future innovative reactors. In this respect, it becomes 
crucial to bring together European designers, TSOs, research organizations 
and utilities already involved (or to be involved) in innovative reactors and 
that constitute the best means in order to propose European harmonized 
safety assessment practices and to consolidate their work within the 
EURATOM contribution to GIF. 
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1. Scope of the project 
                                 The SARGEN_IV consortium 
 
The SARGEN_IV includes 22 organisations and its complementarity is based on: 
  
 Experts from designers, R&D organizations and universities each having a large knowledge 
of at least one of the four selected innovative reactors: CEA(Fr), AREVA (Fr), SCK-CEN 
(Be), AMEC(UK), ANSALDO (It) KIT (De), UJV (Cz), VUJE (Sk), MTA EK (Hu) HZDR( De), 
RWTH (De)  
 
 Safety experts from all  of the European Technical Safety Orrganization (ETSON: IRSN (Fr), 
GRS (De), VTT (Fi), UJV (Cz), VUJE (Sk)  LEI (Li), BELV (Be), PSI (Ch) and  from other 
organizations and universities: UNIMAN (UK), UPM (Sp), ENEA (It) 
 
 One of the most important electricity producer (EDF) in Europe which was also largely  
involved in the French SFR Superphénix operation 
 
  The EU Joint Research Centre in Petten JRC (Nth). 
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The SARGEN_IV project has four main objectives: 
 
 Identification and categorization of the critical safety features 
associated with the four concepts 
 
 Review of the available safety methodologies followed by a proposal for 
harmonization of the safety assessment practices for innovative 
reactors 
 
 Test application of the proposed European methodology 
 
 Development of an European roadmap for the fast reactors safety 
R&D 
 
SARGEN_IV started in January 2012 with two years duration. Up till now the two 
first objectives are nearly achieved and their main results are presented hereafter. 
 
2. Objectives and organization 
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3. Identification and categorization of the critical  
    safety features associated with the four  concepts 
In a first step, relevant safety issues and corresponding initiating events 
have been identified for the four representative fast reactor systems 
selected in the ESNII Deployment Strategy. 
Secondly, to further systematize the consideration of safety issues and 
characteristics for a consistent build-up of the safety architecture and 
development of adequate provisions, the SARGEN_IV project aimed at 
categorizing the individual issues identified for the ESNII concepts to 
several common “families”.  
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.  
The categorization was adopted according to: 
 
 Common phenomena related to: 
o Materials (fuel, coolant, structure, absorber) 
o Aspects specific to fast reactors 
o Aspects specific to design solutions envisaged for ESNII concepts, and 
 
 Possible impact on the fulfillment of fundamental safety functions related 
to: 
o Control of reactivity 
o Removal of heat 
o Confinement of radioactive materials 
 
3. Identification and categorization of the critical  
    safety features associated with the four  concepts 
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Some examples –  
 Coolant 
o Boiling temperature 
 High for LFRs and FASTEF (ca. 1700°C) 
 Medium for SFRs (ca. 880°C)  
 Not relevant for GFRs (coolant in single, gaseous phase) 
o  Thermal inertia 
 High for SFRs, LFRs, FASTEF due to the high volumetric heat capacity of 
coolant and coolant inventories 
 Low for GFRs (provided only by core and structures) 
o Reaction with air and water 
 High for SFRs (chemically strongly exothermic) 
 Low for LFRs and FASTEF (no exothermic reactions), but further R&D needed 
to understand consequences of SG tube ruptures 
 GFRs: Helium inert when in contact with water 
o Coolant compatibility with structures 
 SFRs: austenitic steels, such as 316L or 15/15 Ti, not particularly sensitive to 
corrosion when the sodium is “clean” (i.e: without impurities) 
 LFRs (FASTEF): dedicated corrosion & erosion prevention measures necessary 
(control of the concentration of dissolved O in the coolant, material coatings) 
3. Identification and categorization of the critical  
    safety features associated with the four  concepts 
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Some examples  
 
 Aspects specific to fast reactors 
 
oCoolant reactivity void coefficient 
o Could be highly positive for SFRs, based on the earlier core designs 
(efforts ongoing to reduce the coefficient for ASTRID) 
o Still positive, but lower for LFRs (ALFRED, 2$) 
o Low for GFR (ALLEGRO, 0.25$) 
o Negative for FASTEF (-7.7$) 
oConsidered need of mitigation measures (core catcher) in case of core melting  
 Yes for SFR 
 No for ALFRED LFR and FASTEF 
 Not determined for GFR 
oSensitivity to coolant blockage accident related to the power density 
oRisk of positive reactivity insertion due the core compaction in particular as a 
consequence of earthquake loadings 
3. Identification and categorization of the critical  
    safety features associated with the four  concepts 
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.  
 4. Review of safety assessment methodologies 
 
Various safety methodologies are already (or will be) available that could be 
applied to the ESNII prototypes, pilot plants and demonstrators, which have been 
disseminated and analyzed inside the SARGEN_IV consortium such as:  
 
 Methodologies dedicated to innovative reactors and issued by the GIF 
Reactor Safety Working Group (RSWG) and from the International Project 
on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (IAEA/INPRO) safety 
assessment methodology 
 
 National safety approaches (France, Germany, Spain, Finland, Belgium) and 
the associated experience feedback in particular for the SFRs built in France 
and Germany as well as for the Finish European Pressurized Reactor (EPRTM) 
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.  
 4. Review of safety assessment methodologies 
 
 Safety approaches adopted in European collaborative projects related to 
the four concepts (CP-ESFR for SFR, LEADER for LFRs, GoFastR for GFR 
and CDT for FASTEF) 
 
 Documents coming from international organizations such as IAEA or the 
Western Europe Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA) and available 
for the safety assessment of innovative reactors including methodology used 
for the European NPP “stress tests” 
 
Four documents have been issued related to this review and have been used to 
prepare the proposal for a harmonization of the safety practices for innovative 
reactors. 
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 5.  Proposal for a harmonization of the  
     safety practices for innovative reactors 
Some key points : 
 
 Safety assessment should be performed for both reactor and fuel 
storage, in all plant states and conditions – including maintenance stages - 
over the lifetime of the installation, up to decommissioning.  
 
 Waste management and workers radiological protection should also be taken 
into account 
 
 Moreover, human and organizational factors with also man-induced situations 
are a part of the safety assessment 
 
 Security/safeguard aspects should be dealt in an integrated manner.  
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 5. Proposal for a harmonization of the safety    
     practices for innovative reactors 
Some key points : 
 
 
 Besides, chemical effects could be a challenging issue with regard to 
designs of GEN-IV reactors currently in consideration.  
 
 Ambitious safety objectives are targeted even though safety goals of GIF 
are not particularly prescriptive when specifying objectives for GEN-IV nuclear 
power plants (NPP).  
 
 Nevertheless, the goal is to reduce potential consequences and impact 
on public, workers and environment as well as occurrence/frequency of 
failures, incidental and accidental situations. 
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The work highlights the importance of safety principles in achievement of safety 
objectives:  
 
o Defense-In-Depth (DiD) principle remains fundamental. An overall reinforcement 
of DiD is expected for GEN-IV NPP, including improved independence between 
all levels of DiD. A particularly important issue for GEN-IV reactor could be to 
clearly define level 4 for each plant design.  
o Other principles as barriers, As Low As Reasonable Achievable (ALARA) 
principle and As Low As Reasonable Practicable (ALARP) principle should also 
be enhanced.  
o Concerning fundamental safety functions, an inherent approach should reinforce 
the fulfillment of fundamental safety functions e.g. the consequences for some 
situations should be reduced and the grace periods should be extended. For the 
same reason, the use of passive systems can be envisaged. 
o Practical elimination is another important principle, but it requires in-depth 
analyses for GEN-IV NPP. Lastly, the need of two complementary and 
integrated approaches, the deterministic and the probabilistic ones, is reiterated. 
 
 5.  Proposal for a harmonization of the  
     safety practices for innovative reactors 
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About the safety assessment: 
 
 A safety assessment should be performed with regard to safety objectives in 
particular those proposed by WENRA and considering safety principles, 
SARGEN_IV project proposes to use some methodologies such as the 
Qualitative Safety Features Review (QSR), the Objective Provision Tree (OPT) 
and the Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) for the global safety 
assessment process to provide feedback.  
 
 Concerning the detailed safety assessment, there is no clear specificity for GEN-
IV NPP. Nevertheless, the comprehensive set of postulated initiating events could 
be quite different from GEN-III NPP. Moreover, they should be assessed with 
more stringent rules and acceptance criteria.  
 5.  Proposal for a harmonization of the  
     safety practices for innovative reactors 
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  5. Proposal for a harmonization of the safety  
      practices for innovative reactors 
 
About the safety assessment: 
 
 Assessment of hazards would be a challenging  aspect of next generation 
of NPP safety assessment and should be improved, which is confirmed by 
the first insights of Fukushima Daiichi TEPCO reactors accidents. These 
first insights, on the basis of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators 
Group (ENSREG) specifications and conclusions, should be extrapolated 
to new designs, which poses  another challenge for GEN-IV NPP. 
 
 For example the total loss of power sources, the total loss of the ultimate 
heat sink(s) and the combination of both have to be considered with also 
the management of a severe accident in this case. Provisions to cope with 
these events notably to improve the grace period before cliff-edge effects 
and thus allowing back-up measures to be implemented have to be 
defined and should be considered as hardened equipments.  
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 6. Further work 
The next phase of the SARGEN_IV project comprised the test application 
of the proposed harmonized European practices to the selected initiating 
events of the reactor prototypes.  
 
This will be aimed to identify needs on R&D and provide feedback to the 
harmonized European practices in support for the EURATOM contribution 
to the preparation of GEN-IV “white paper” on nuclear safety for European 
concepts.   
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION! 
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